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Abstract:  
In a one-period setting Green (1984) demonstrates that convertible debt perfectly 
mitigates the asset substitution problem by curbing shareholders’ incentive to increase 
risk. This is because claimholders design the capital structure precisely when the risk-
shifting opportunity is available. In practice, firms do not alter their capital structure over 
the life of the convertible debt. Hence, when the risk-shifting opportunity arises, 
convertible debt design may no longer match with firm asset value to mitigate the asset 
substitution problem. This leaves room for a strategic non-cooperative game between 
shareholders and convertible debtholders. We show that two risk-shifting scenarios arise 
as attainable Nash equilibria. Pure asset substitution occurs when, despite convertible 
debtholders not exercising their conversion option, shareholders still find it profitable to 
shift risk. Strategic conversion occurs when, despite convertible debtholders giving up 
the conversion option value, they are better off receiving their share of the wealth 
expropriation from straight debtholders. We use contingent claims analysis and the 
Black and Scholes (1973) setup to characterize the equilibria. Even when initial 
convertibles debt is endogenously designed so as to minimize the likelihood of risk-
shifting equilibria, we show that asset substitution cannot be completely eliminated. Our 
overall conclusion is that – in contrast to agency theory’s claim – convertible debt is an 
imperfect instrument for mitigating shareholders’ incentive to increase risk. 
 
Keywords: Convertible debt, risk-shifting, non-cooperative game  
 
JEL Classification: C72, G32 
 
1 Introduction
This paper addresses the strategic dimension surrounding the exercise of the conversion
option that is embedded in convertible debt contracts. Among the possible rationales for
issuing convertible debt is the mitigation of the asset substitution problem put forward
by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
1
Due to the limited liability principle, equity payoﬀ is
a convex function of ﬁrm value that provides shareholders with an incentive to increase
risk (see Galai and Masulis 1976). By selecting riskier projects in a way that is not
anticipated by creditors, shareholders can transfer wealth to their own beneﬁt. Eisdorfer
(2008) provides recent evidence of asset substitution.
In this paper, we argue that some issues regarding the use of convertible debt as a
risk mitigating ﬁnancial instrument are still left unresolved. Green (1984) and MacMinn
(1992) show that the risk-shifting problem can be fully eliminated when the investment op-
portunity and the convertible debt issue are contemporaneous.
2
Their one-period setting
ensures the existence of a convertible debt contract that perfectly mitigates sharehold-
ers’ incentive to increase risk. However, if shareholders have the opportunity to beneﬁt
from shifting risk, it is unclear why they would, at the same time, agree on designing a
convertible debt contract in the capital structure. Rather, the agency theory literature
views convertible debt as a pre-commitment device for curbing shareholders’ incentive to
increase risk. That is, at some point in time, claimholders agree on a capital structure
that reﬂects their commitment to avoid asset substitution over a certain time horizon.
1
Other rationales for issuing convertible debt include: heterogeneous risk assessment
(Brennan and Schwartz 1988), backdoor equity ﬁnancing (Stein 1992), or ﬁnancing se-
quential investments (Mayers 1998).
2
Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1998, 1999) and Elliott, Koëter-Kant and Warr (2004)
provide empirical evidence of ﬁrms using convertibles to reduce asset substitution.
2
Yet, when the risk-shifting opportunity arises, they may not be able to reach a similar
agreement to redesign capital structure. In other words, they will have to deal with the
risk-shifting opportunity according to contract terms that were previously negotiated.
3
As a matter of fact, Chang, Chen and Liu (2004) provide evidence that ﬁrms issue con-
vertible debt to ﬁnance future growth opportunities and that they do not alter their
capital structure over the life of the convertible debt.
We therefore extend Green’s analysis by allowing the risk-shifting opportunity to
occur after the capital structure is designed, leaving room for a strategic game to be
played between shareholders and convertible debtholders when the opportunity to shift
risk arises.
4
Despite the initial capital structure, there are two reasons why asset substi-
tution might still take place. First, shareholders may ﬁnd that the convertible no longer
mitigates their incentive to increase risk. Hence, whatever the convertible debtholders’
action, shareholders will seize the opportunity to shift risk. We refer to such a situation
as pure asset substitution. Second, convertible debtholders can act strategically when
considering the decision to convert. Speciﬁcally, they trade oﬀ the suboptimal exercise
of the conversion option with the beneﬁts of aligning their interests with those of ini-
tial shareholders, i.e. restoring the incentive to take risk and transferring wealth at the
expense of straight debtholders. We refer to such a situation as strategic conversion.
We analyze the decisions to shift risk and to convert as a non-cooperative game
3
Mayers (1998) further argues that convertible debt ﬁnancing is motivated by a desire
to minimize security issue costs. That is, convertible debt is designed precisely to avoid
having to redesign capital structure in the future.
4
Another direction, not pursued here, is to allow shareholders to adjust asset volatility
(see Hennessy and Tserlukevich 2004). However, evidence that corporate investment is
lumpy (see Doms and Dunne, 1998, or Nilsen and Schiantarelli, 2003) suggests that in
practice, shareholders may not have the option to continuously select asset volatility.
3
between shareholders and convertible debtholders.
5
When the game is simultaneous,
we show that pure asset substitution arises as an attainable Nash equilibrium. When
the game is sequential, we further show that strategic conversion arises as an additional
attainable Nash equilibrium. Strategic conversion is further favored by a contractual
means that shareholders may have at their disposal, namely the payment of a special
dividend. We then assess the ex ante likelihood of asset substitution by assuming that
convertible debt is initially designed so as to minimize the probability of risk-shifting.
Although our setup provides the greatest chances for convertible debt to play its role
as a risk-mitigating instrument, there is still room for asset substitution. Our overall
conclusion is that convertible debt is an imperfect instrument for mitigating shareholders’
incentive to increase risk. The agency theoretic rationale for issuing convertible debt may
therefore be overstated.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the assumptions
of the model. Section 3 derives the Nash equilibria for both the simultaneous and the
sequential games. Section 4 carries out a sensitivity analysis to investigate how equilibria
are aﬀected ex post by the risk-shifting magnitude, ﬁnancial leverage and asset value. In
section 5, the design of convertible debt is endogenously determined so as to minimize
the likelihood of risk-shifting equilibria. This makes it possible to assess, ex ante, the
risk-mitigating performance of convertible debt. Section 6 shows how this performance
can be further weakened by a special dividend. Section 7 concludes.
5
The strategic exercise of other options is examined in the literature (see e.g. Grenadier
1996, for the timing of real estate development, or Kulatilaka and Perotti 1998, for in-
vestment with strategic competition). In Bühler and Koziol (2002), a gradual conversion
of convertible debt allows for strategic interplay between claimholders yet, their analysis
does not address the asset substitution problem.
4
2 Assumptions
Our analysis is based on the following assumptions.
The economy The market for assets is complete and arbitrage-free. Trading takes
place in continuous time.
The ﬁrm’s assets The value of the ﬁrm’s assets is a stochastic process (V
t
)
t≥0
deﬁned on the ﬁltered probability space (Ω,F , P, {F
t
}), and is independent of capital
structure choices. In the absence of arbitrage, prices of traded assets discounted at the
risk-free rate are martingales under the equivalent risk-neutral measure Q.
The ﬁrm’s capital structure The ﬁrm is ﬁnanced with equity, senior straight
discount debt and junior convertible discount debt.
6
Without any loss in generality, we
assume that the ﬁrm does not pay any regular dividend. This implies that conversion
policies are solely driven by strategic considerations, and not by the excess yield on
equity.
7
The number of outstanding shares is N . Straight debt promises a face value of
F and matures at date T . Convertible debt promises a face value of M, matures at T
and can be converted anytime up to T into n newly issued shares. We denote by q the
conversion ratio where q = n/(n+N). All agents are supposed to act as a single class of
claimholders.
8
6
Spatt and Sterbenz (1993) and Chesney and Gibson (2001) introduce a distinction
between convertibles and warrants. They show that convertibles, being "bundled" secu-
rities, are more eﬀective at mitigating the asset substitution problem.
7
Asquith and Mullins (1991) provide evidence that voluntary conversion is related to
the diﬀerential between the coupon and the dividends on the converted stock.
8
Gradual conversion of convertible debt is examined by Emanuel (1983), Constantinides
(1984), Constantinides and Rosenthal (1984), and Bühler and Koziol (2002).
5
The risk-shifting opportunity The asset substitution problem consists of the
opportunity to shift risk before debt matures. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the ﬁrm will
be presented with the option to increase the risk of assets.
9
This increase in risk reﬂects
for instance a technology shock, a change in regulation, or the entry of a new competitor
that the ﬁrm will face. The timing of the risk-shifting opportunity is random.
Claimholders’ behavior All claimholders share the same information. They ob-
serve asset value dynamics. They agree on the characteristics of the risk-shifting opportu-
nity. It is assumed that the asset value process is observable to all claimholders. However,
it is not veriﬁable. Therefore claimholders cannot write a contract contingent on every
sample path of asset value.
10
A second-best alternative is the convertible debt contract,
which induces local concavity in equity payoﬀ, thereby mitigating shareholders’ incentive
to increase risk. Claimholders also agree on designing the capital structure that mini-
mizes the probability of asset substitution. We therefore examine the setup under which
convertible debt has the greatest chances to fulﬁll its role as a risk-mitigating instrument.
The timing of events The risk-shifting opportunity can randomly occur at any
time θ between the initial contracting date and debt maturity. At date θ, convertible
debtholders decide on the conversion of their claim and shareholders choose the level of
asset risk. Claimholders can act either simultaneously or sequentially. The timing of
9
In the spirit of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Gavish and Kalay (1983), and Green and
Talmor (1986), we focus on the strict asset substitution problem. That is, shareholders
may manipulate ﬁrm risk without altering the value of ﬁrm assets. This induces that,
as in the model of Green (1984), the martingale pricing technique still applies with the
same numeraire.
10
Speciﬁcally, the future level of asset risk cannot be contracted upon. If it could, asset
substitution would not be an issue.
6
events is shown in Figure 1.
The major diﬀerence from Green’s setup is that the design of convertible debt may
not be synchronous with the possible shift in risk. The one-period setup in Green (1984)
is equivalent to assuming that claimholders can always redesign contracts every time a
risk-shifting opportunity arises. However, it is not clear why shareholders would accept
such a renegotiation if they can actually beneﬁt from shifting risk. We therefore rely on
the more realistic assumption that capital structure is designed before the risk-shifting
opportunity occurs so that all claimholders agree on their best commitment to avoid asset
substitution over a certain time horizon. Our standpoint is consistent with Ju and Ou-
Yang (2006) who show that the asset substitution problem becomes more severe as the
ﬁrm cannot issue debt on a repetitive basis. As a matter of fact, straight and convertible
bonds are mostly issued as long-term contracts.
11
3 Game theory analysis
Whenever the risk-shifting opportunity occurs, shareholders will decide whether or not
to seize this opportunity. Similarly, convertible debtholders will reconsider the exercise of
their conversion option. Table 1 indicates the four possible values of equity and convertible
debt at time θ whether asset substitution takes place or not, and whether convertible
debtholders exercise their conversion option at date θ or postpone their decision until T .
We denote by S
t
and C
t
the time−t values of equity and convertible debt, respectively.
11
Krishnaswami and Yaman (2008) report a median maturity of about 20 years for
convertibles and 10 years for straight debt in their sample of 660 straight and 1,862
convertible bonds issued between 1983 and 1998. Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) report
an average maturity of 17 years for their sample of convertible bonds issued between 1980
and 1996.
7
Superscripts a and a refer to the occurrence and non-occurrence of asset substitution,
respectively. Similarly, superscripts e and e refer to the occurrence and non-occurrence
of early conversion, respectively.
Since the decision of shareholders to substitute assets and that of convertible debthold-
ers to convert early are both discretionary, Table 1 can be viewed as the representation
of the non-cooperative game between these two claimants.
12
In his setup, Green (1984)
only considers two of the four cells of Table 1: either the convertible debt design pre-
cludes asset substitution until time T (south-east cell), or this design does not make the
shareholders’ payoﬀ concave enough to oﬀset the gains from shift in risk (north-east cell).
Lemma 1 establishes three inequalities with which shareholders and convertible debthold-
ers are confronted, irrespective of any strategic consideration.
Lemma 1 For any time θ < T , the following inequalities prevail
S
a,e
θ
> S
a,e
θ
, C
a,e
θ
> C
a,e
θ
, C
a,e
θ
> C
a,e
θ
.
The ﬁrst inequality is a consequence of asset substitution: provided that convertibles
are converted, only straight debt remains in the ﬁrm’s liabilities. Hence, equity payoﬀ
is convex again and shareholders are better oﬀ increasing asset risk. Second and third
inequalities follow from Merton’s (1973) non-early exercise property for American call op-
tions on non-dividend paying asset. Ingersoll (1977) applies this property to convertibles
and shows that it is not optimal to exercise a convertible before maturity.
We call Status Quo the Nash equilibrium where: (i) shareholders are better oﬀ not
substituting assets at date θ and (ii) convertible debtholders do not exercise their con-
12
Note that straight debtholders do not interfere in the game and, because ﬁrm asset
value is invariant to asset substitution, the value of their claim can be retrieved from the
other two securities values.
8
version option before T . It yields the pair
{
S
a,e
θ
, C
a,e
θ
}
and rules out any wealth transfer
at the expense of straight and convertible debtholders.
The situation depicted in the north-west cell of the table is of special interest. On the
one hand, convertible debtholders depart from Ingersoll’s (1977) optimal exercise rule and
are better oﬀ converting early. On the other hand, shareholders choose to shift risk despite
the presence of convertible debt in the capital structure. This contingent decision that
yields the pair
{
S
a,e
θ
, C
a,e
θ
}
is referred to as the Strategic Conversion Nash equilibrium.
The other possible Nash equilibrium is the Pure Asset Substitution that yields the pair
{
S
a,e
θ
, C
a,e
θ
}
. Note that early conversion restores the convexity of shareholders’ payoﬀ.
Consequently, asset substitution implies that S
a,e
θ
> S
a,e
θ
, and the pair
{
S
a,e
θ
, C
a,e
θ
}
is
dominated by Strategic Conversion. In other words, the south-west cell cannot support
a Nash equilibrium.
To solve the non-cooperative game depicted in Table 1, one must specify the timing of
actions. The game can be played either sequentially — and a ﬁrst mover must be deﬁned —
or simultaneously. Typically, the following factors will determine how the game is played:
the observability of the risk-shifting opportunity, the duration of the opportunity window,
and the reversibility of the decision to increase risk.
Admittedly, the combined eﬀect of these factors will generate case-by-case outcomes.
Nevertheless, the incentive for shareholders to move ﬁrst is all the stronger since:
• they observe the risk-shifting opportunity before all other claimholders. Sharehold-
ers can then announce that they have increased asset risk
13
and let convertible
13
The limiting case is where the risk-shifting opportunity is observed solely by sharehold-
ers and information available to convertible debtholders only originates from shareholders’
announcements.
9
debtholders decide whether to convert or not;
• the risk-shifting opportunity window is short.
14
Shareholders who run the company
must hurry to seize the opportunity and cannot wait for convertible debtholders to
move ﬁrst;
• the decision to seize the risk-shifting opportunity is reversible. Convertible debthold-
ers will be reluctant to make their move — which is contractually irreversible — if
they fear shareholders may retract.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibria for all possible game sequences
(all proofs are gathered in the appendix).
Proposition 2 (A). In the sequential game in which convertible debtholders move ﬁrst,
the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria are:
- Status Quo iﬀ S
a,e
θ
≥ S
a,e
θ
and C
a,e
θ
≥ C
a,e
θ
,
- Strategic Conversion iﬀ S
a,e
θ
≥ S
a,e
θ
and C
a,e
θ
> C
a,e
θ
,
- Pure Asset Substitution iﬀ S
a,e
θ
> S
a,e
θ
.
(B). In the sequential game in which shareholders move ﬁrst and in the simultaneous
game, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria are:
- Status Quo iﬀ S
a,e
θ
≥ S
a,e
θ
,
- Pure Asset Substitution iﬀ S
a,e
θ
> S
a,e
θ
.
Proposition 2 challenges the risk-mitigating eﬀect of convertible debt. It provides
the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for equilibria other than Status Quo to prevail.
Independent of the game sequence, the dynamic nature of the game leaves room for
14
The risk-shifting opportunity window can be short because of technology constraints,
regulatory changes or competitors’ pressure.
10
Pure Asset Substitution. This equilibrium arises when shareholders ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
increase asset risk irrespective of the convertible debt design. In the sequential game in
which convertible debtholders move ﬁrst, Proposition 2 shows that a third equilibrium
can arise. Convertible debtholders choose to convert, which leaves the capital structure
with equity and straight debt only. Hence, the shareholders’ payoﬀ becomes convex,
which restores their incentive for asset substitution.
Note that the condition ensuring Pure Asset Substitution is the same for all game
sequences. Some cases that lead to Status Quo in game sequence (B) will lead to Strategic
Conversion in game sequence (A).
The next subsection introduces the contingent claims framework that is needed to
assess the likelihood of equilibria.
4 Contingent claims framework
Analyzing corporate securities as contingent claims on the ﬁrm’s assets allows us to ana-
lytically characterize the inequalities given in Proposition 2. In the standard contingent
claims approach, the payoﬀs of corporate securities are expressed in terms of options
written on the value of assets, and the level of asset risk is adequately measured by asset
return volatility. Let σdenote the initial level of asset return volatility. The risk-shifting
opportunity consists in increasing asset return volatility to the level α > σ.
Let c (v, τ , k, s) denote the value of the call option written on v, with time to maturity
τ , strike price k, and asset return volatility s. The value of equity upon the risk-shifting
opportunity is given by
S
a,e
θ
= c (V
θ
, T − θ,F +M,σ)− q · c (V
θ
, T − θ, F +M/q, σ) , (1)
11
if shareholders do not seize the opportunity to shift risk and there is no early conversion,
and by
S
a,e
θ
= c (V
θ
, T − θ,F +M,α)− q · c (V
θ
, T − θ, F +M/q,α) , (2)
if they do (and still no early conversion).
In the last two equations, the ﬁrst call option reﬂects shareholders’ limited liability
on their total obligations F +M. The second call option captures the equity dilution
if conversion occurs upon debt maturity (that is, when q (V
T
− F) > M or, equivalently
V
T
> F +M/q).
The value of convertible debt upon the risk-shifting opportunity is given by
C
a,e
θ
= c (V
θ
, T − θ,F, σ)− c (V
θ
, T − θ,F +M,σ) + q · c (V
θ
, T − θ,F +M/q, σ) , (3)
if shareholders do not seize the opportunity to shift risk and there is no early conversion,
and by
C
a,e
θ
= q · c (V
θ
, T − θ,F, α) , (4)
if they do and there is early conversion.
In equation (3), the ﬁrst two call options reﬂect a debt claim that is junior to straight
debt. The third call option represents the value of the option to convert upon maturity.
In equation (4), debt is converted early so convertible debtholders hold a fraction q of
equity, which turns out to be a call option on the ﬁrm’s assets with shifted volatility α
and debt nominal F .
Contracts are designed at the initial date, but asset value will ﬂuctuate between the
initial date and the occurrence of the risk-shifting opportunity. Hence, the equilibrium
that will prevail at date θ will depend on the value of assets at that date. Using the
call option analogies from equations (1)—(4), we can further characterize the equilibria
12
identiﬁed in Proposition 2. Speciﬁcally, combining equations (1) and (2), Appendix A
shows that the equation S
a,e
θ
= S
a,e
θ
has only one root in V . By contrast, combining
equations (3) and (4), the equation C
a,e
θ
= C
a,e
θ
has either zero or two roots in V . We
therefore obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The occurrence of Status Quo, Strategic Conversion, or Pure Asset Sub-
stitution is determined by the value of assets upon θ in the following way:
• If the equation C
a,e
θ
= C
a,e
θ
has no root in V
Status Quo ⇐⇒ not attainable
Strategic Conversion ⇐⇒ V
θ
≥ V
S
θ
Pure Asset Substitution ⇐⇒ V
θ
< V
S
θ
• If the equation C
a,e
θ
= C
a,e
θ
has two roots in V
Status Quo ⇐⇒ V
θ
∈ [min
(
V
C+
θ
, V
S
θ
)
, V
C+
θ
]
Strategic Conversion ⇐⇒ V
θ
∈
[
max
(
V
S
θ
, V
C+
θ
)
,∞
[
Pure Asset Substitution ⇐⇒ V
θ
< V
S
θ
where V
S
θ
is the unique root of S
a,e
θ
= S
a,e
θ
, and V
C+
θ
is the highest root, when it
exists, of C
a,e
θ
= C
a,e
θ
.
We see from Proposition 3 that Status Quo can only occur if V
C+
θ
> V
S
θ
.
Finally, the contingent claims analysis allows us to formulate the next proposition.
Proposition 4 Strategic Conversion makes both shareholders and convertible debtholders
better oﬀ than in Status Quo.
13
Strategic Conversion involves a wealth transfer at the expense of straight debtholders
(and that is why it will only occur if there is straight debt in the capital structure).
Proposition 4 further shows that this wealth transfer is at the sole expense of straight
debtholders. This implies that shareholders have the incentive to make the equilibrium
shift from Status Quo to Strategic Conversion. They can actually do so by increasing the
moneyness of the conversion option. One way is to pay a dividend upon the risk-shifting
opportunity to induce early conversion. We will explore this possibility in section 7.
5 Ex post risk-shifting incentives in a diﬀusion setting
Proposition 3 indicates that, for a given convertible debt contract designed at the initial
date, the dynamics of asset value will determine which equilibrium prevails when the
opportunity to shift risk occurs. For the remainder of our analysis, we position ourselves
in the Black and Scholes (1973) setting. The stochastic process (V
t
)
t≥0
follows a geometric
Brownian motion under P
dV
t
V
t
= μdt+ σdW
t
,
where (W
t
)
t≥0
is a standard Brownian motion.
Figure 2 represents a Black-Scholes illustration of our model. It shows, for diﬀerent
values of assets, the diﬀerence ∆S = S
a,e
θ
−S
a,e
θ
. That is, what shareholders gain (or lose
if negative) from not substituting assets conditional on no early exercise from convertible
debtholders. Figure 2 also shows the diﬀerence ∆C = C
a,e
θ
− C
a,e
θ
. That is, what con-
vertible debtholders gain (or lose if negative) from a state with no asset substitution and
no early exercise to a state of asset substitution and early exercise. From Proposition 2,
we know that the signs of ∆S and ∆C determine the equilibrium.
14
The top ﬁgures (2a and 2b) represent cases where the three equilibria are attainable.
By contrast, the bottom ﬁgures (2c and 2d) show cases where Status Quo no longer exists
either because V
C+
θ
< V
S
θ
(ﬁgure 2c) or because the equation C
a,e
θ
= C
a,e
θ
has no root in
V (ﬁgure 2d).
Figure 2a represents a situation where Status Quo is a dominant equilibrium. Initial
capital structure is: straight debt nominal F = 40, convertible debt nominal M = 20,
conversion ratio q = 0.4, maturity of both debts T = 10. The initial value of assets is
V = 100. Five years later, shareholders are presented with the opportunity to increase
risk from σ = 0.2 to α = 0.3. Our model shows that the convertible debt design eﬀectively
curbs shareholders’ incentive to increase risk (i.e. Status Quo prevails) if asset value lies
between 104 and 372. If asset value is below 104, then Pure Asset Substitution occurs.
Indeed, for low asset values, the conversion option is out-of-the-money, which has two
consequences. First, convertible debtholders have no incentive to exercise their option.
Second, the convertible debt contract is no longer suited to preventing shareholders from
shifting risk. If asset value exceeds 372, then Strategic Conversion occurs. Indeed, for very
high asset values, the conversion option is deep in-the-money. Convertible debtholders
ﬁnd that the beneﬁt of getting their share of the assets with shifted volatility more than
oﬀsets the loss incurred from prematurely exercising their American call option on equity.
Figure 2b depicts a similar situation, but the ﬁrm is now more highly levered (F = 60
and M = 40). Higher leverage leaves more room for Pure Asset Substitution (now
occurring for asset values below 170 after ﬁve years). Furthermore, the conversion op-
tion is more in-the-money (q = 0.6) and the risk-shifting opportunity is more tempting
(α = 0.35) leaving more room for Strategic Conversion (now occurring for asset values
above 219 after ﬁve years). Therefore, the Status Quo equilibrium shrinks from both
15
sides.
In Figure 2c, ﬁrm leverage is the same as in ﬁgure 2a yet, convertible debtholders have
a lower weight in the initial capital structure (M = 10 and F = 50). In addition, their
conversion option is further out-of-the-money (q = 0.2). Consequently, they can no longer
play their risk-mitigating role when the risk-shifting opportunity arises ﬁve years later.
Status Quo is not attainable and the prevailing equilibrium is Pure Asset Substitution if
asset value is below 132 after ﬁve years, or Strategic Conversion otherwise.
Figure 2d is another example where Status Quo is unattainable. This is mostly driven
by the fact that the risk-shifting magnitude is high (α = 0.4) and the conversion option
is in-the-money (q = 0.4). The equilibrium is Pure Asset Substitution if asset value is
below 130 after ﬁve years or Strategic Conversion otherwise.
Figure 3 shows the prevailing equilibria as a function of asset value and also as a
function of shifted volatility for given initial straight and convertible debt contracts.
Figure 3a stands as a base case with straight debt nominal F = 40, convertible debt
nominal M = 20, conversion ratio q = 0.4, initial maturity of both debts T = 10 and
where the risk-shifting opportunity arises at date θ = 5. When asset value is low, any
opportunity to increase risk will be seized by shareholders irrespective of the convertible
debtholders’ move, leading to Pure Asset Substitution. As asset value increases, the
convertible debt curbs shareholders’ incentive to shift risk and shareholders therefore
require a higher shifted volatility to induce Pure Asset Substitution. Even though the
level of shifted volatility is not high enough to lead to Pure Asset Substitution, it may
still be high enough for convertible debtholders to convert early and induce Strategic
Conversion. In all other cases where asset value is relatively high and shifted volatility is
relatively low, Status Quo prevails.
16
Figures 3b, 3c and 3d represent a sensitivity analysis with respect to a single pa-
rameter from the base case. In Figure 3b, straight debt nominal is F = 50 and Pure
Asset Substitution is more prevalent. In Figure 3c, convertible debt nominal is M = 30.
Convertible debtholders have more power to curb shareholders’ incentive to increase risk
— making Status Quo more prevalent. At the same time, convertible debtholders have
more incentive to keep their debt claim — reducing the scope for Strategic Conversion.
In Figure 3d, the conversion ratio is q = 0.5, which basically leaves the area for Pure
Asset Substitution unchanged. However, Strategic Conversion prevails for lower values
of shifted volatility.
6 Risk-shifting and initial contract design
So far, we have conducted our analysis of equilibria using exogenously speciﬁed convertible
debt contracts. No speciﬁc eﬀort was made as such to structure a convertible debt
contract that would best cope with shareholders’ incentive to increase risk. This could
underestimate the eﬀectiveness of convertible debt as a risk-mitigating instrument. In this
section, we endogenize the design of convertible debt and determine the initial contract
terms (M,q) that maximize the probability of Status Quo.
To this end, we must make an assumption as to the timing of the risk-shifting opportu-
nity. Speciﬁcally, all claimholders agree that the timing of the risk-shifting opportunity is
characterized by the ﬁrst jump time of a standard Poisson process with constant intensity
λ. Thus, the cumulative distribution function of θ is given by
P (x < θ) = e
−λx
, x ∈ R
+
.
Parameter λ can be interpreted as the instantaneous probability of the risk-shifting op-
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portunity. For simplicity, risk-shifting magnitude is kept constant at α.
Under our assumption on the dynamics of asset value, the probability that the time−t
asset value V
t
lies within the interval [x
min
, x
max
] is given by
π (V, x
min
, x
max
, t) = Φ
⎛
⎝
ln
x
max
V
−
(
μ−
σ
2
2
)
t
σ
√
t
⎞
⎠
− Φ
⎛
⎝
ln
x
min
V
−
(
μ−
σ
2
2
)
t
σ
√
t
⎞
⎠
,
where V is the initial asset value and Φ (.) stands for the standard cumulative normal
distribution function.
Using Proposition 3, the probability of Status Quo is the probability that asset value
upon θ lies within the interval
[
V
S
θ
, V
C+
θ
]
, conditional on there being a risk-shifting
opportunity before debt contracts mature, that is
∫
T
0
λe
−λθ
· π
(
V
θ
, V
S
θ
, V
C+
θ
, θ
)
dθ.
The initial convertible debt contract (M
∗
, q
∗
) is found numerically by maximizing the
above expression.
Figure 4 plots the probability of Status Quo as a function of M and q. The optimal
contract for the case depicted by Figure 4 is M
∗
= 29.9 and q
∗
= 0.50. Numerical results
regarding equilibrium probabilities are reported in Table 2. We rely on a base case and
perform a sensitivity analysis by changing one parameter value at a time. To simplify
the interpretation, we report the equilibrium probabilities conditional on the occurrence
of a risk-shifting opportunity before debt maturity, that is, all probabilities are divided
by 1− e
−λT
so that they sum up to unity.
The diﬀerence between the probability of Status Quo and 1 measures how imperfectly
convertible debt mitigates shareholders’ incentive to increase risk. In our simulations,
conditional probabilities of Status Quo range from 45.7% to 78.1%, indicating that our
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dynamic model leaves signiﬁcant room for risk-shifting. Note that Strategic Conversion
remains a marginal equilibrium (with conditional probability never above 5%). risk-
shifting mostly occurs through Pure Asset Substitution — an equilibrium which, in some
cases, is even more likely than Status Quo. The likelihood of risk-shifting increases
for higher straight nominal debt or shifted volatility. A higher straight nominal debt
raises the equity payoﬀ convexity, inducing Pure Asset Substitution. A higher shifted
volatility provides more beneﬁts for shareholders, whether they substitute assets on their
own initiative or with the cooperation of convertible debtholders. The likelihood of risk-
shifting also increases for higher debt maturity or a higher probability of risk-shifting
opportunity.
As far as the optimal convertible debt contract is concerned, a striking result is that
the optimal conversion ratio is almost insensitive to all parameters except for the risk-
shifting magnitude (α). We also note that the likelihood of risk-shifting opportunity
(λ) has very little eﬀect on the optimal convertible debt nominal. As a consequence, if
claimholders’ beliefs are the same for the magnitude of the risk-shifting opportunity and
only diﬀer with regard to its likelihood, they will agree on the same design of convertible
debt.
7 The case for a special dividend
As mentioned in our comment of Proposition 4, shareholders can make the equilibrium
shift from Status Quo to Strategic Conversion by paying a special dividend.
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Let δ
15
The following analysis is however subject to two caveats. First, special dividends must
be announced prior to actual distribution. This delay may jeopardize the implementation
of the strategic dividend policy as the opportunity to shift assets may have vanished before
the payment date. Second, as initially put forward by Smith and Warner (1979), typical
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denote the special dividend that shareholders will distribute just after θ. We assume
that δ is ﬁnanced by a volatility-invariant asset sale (typically retained earnings to be
reinvested in projects with same level of risk). We therefore preclude any security issuing
to ﬁnance a special dividend.
The conditions given in Proposition 2, which characterize the equilibria, remain the
same except that equity and convertible debt values must now account for the payment
of the special dividend. Speciﬁcally
S
a,e
θ
= c (V
θ
− δ, T − θ,F +M,σ)− q · c (V
θ
− δ, T − θ,F +M/q, σ) ,
S
a,e
θ
= c (V
θ
− δ, T − θ,F +M,α)− q · c (V
θ
− δ, T − θ,F +M/q,α) ,
C
a,e
θ
= c (V
θ
− δ, T − θ,F, σ)− c (V
θ
− δ, T − θ,F +M,σ)
+q · c (V
θ
− δ, T − θ,F +M/q, σ) ,
C
a,e
θ
= q · c (V
θ
− δ, T − θ, F,α) + q · δ.
Note that the payment of a special dividend has two eﬀects. First, since asset value is
reduced by the amount δ, the moneyness of all call options decreases. Second, the second
term in C
a,e
θ
reﬂects the fact that if convertible debtholders choose to convert early, they
will capture a fraction of the dividend.
Figures 5a and 5b plot the frontiers ∆
˜
S := S
a,e
θ
− S
a,e
θ
and ∆
˜
C := C
a,e
θ
− C
a,e
θ
and
the corresponding equilibria. The special dividend payment makes Strategic Conversion
a more likely outcome at the expense of Status Quo — leaving the likelihood of Pure Asset
Substitution mostly unaﬀected.
covenants restrict the scope for special dividends. In their sample of over 14,000 loans
issued between 1993 and 2001, Bradley and Roberts (2004) ﬁnd that more than 85% of
issues have restrictions on dividend payments.
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8 Conclusion
The rationale advocated by agency theory for issuing convertible debt is to mitigate
shareholders’ incentive to increase risk. Admittedly, in a one-period setting where both
the design of ﬁnancial claims and the opportunity to shift risk occur simultaneously,
convertible debt can eﬃciently solve the asset substitution problem.
In this paper, we allow for the opportunity to shift risk to occur at some random time
after the capital structure is designed. If this opportunity arises prior to debt maturity,
the initial contracts may no longer be suited to curbing the incentive to increase risk. This
leaves room for shareholders and convertible debtholders to act strategically. The outcome
of this non-cooperative game is that, in many cases, shareholders do seize the opportunity
to shift risk, and therefore, convertible debt appears to be an imperfect risk-mitigating
instrument. In the most favorable case where convertible debt is initially designed so
as to minimize the risk-shifting probability, the likelihood for asset substitution is still
non-negligible. The risk-mitigating eﬀect of convertible debt is further weakened when
contractual provisions allow shareholders to pay a special dividend.
As an extension for future research, one might want to examine the case when con-
vertible debt is also callable by shareholders. When the opportunity to shift risk arises,
shareholders must decide upon the exercise of the call option to force conversion. Once
shareholders have decided to force conversion, convertible debtholders know for sure that
the opportunity to shift risk will be seized, irrespective of their behavior. Therefore, this
is no longer a Nash game. Shareholders will assess their optimal decision in view of their
own payoﬀ. We should therefore expect that the call feature will further weaken the
risk-mitigating eﬀect of convertible debt.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
(A). When convertible debtholders move ﬁrst, two sub-game equilibria must be solved,
depending on their initial move. Suppose convertible debtholders opt for conversion at
date θ; they know that shareholders are better oﬀ substituting assets (since by Lemma
1 S
a,e
θ
> S
a,e
θ
). Therefore, their payoﬀ will be C
a,e
θ
. This is to be compared with their
payoﬀ in the case of no early conversion:
• If S
a,e
θ
> S
a,e
θ
, their payoﬀ will be C
a,e
θ
. From Lemma 1, C
a,e
θ
> C
a,e
θ
, hence the
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is given by the pair
{
S
a,e
θ
, C
a,e
θ
}
, i.e. Pure Asset
Substitution obtained.
• If S
a,e
θ
≥ S
a,e
θ
, their payoﬀ will be C
a,e
θ
. Two cases must be distinguished:
— If C
a,e
θ
≥ C
a,e
θ
, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is given by the pair
{
S
a,e
θ
, C
a,e
θ
}
, i.e. Status Quo obtained,
— If C
a,e
θ
> C
a,e
θ
, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is given by the pair
{
S
a,e
θ
, C
a,e
θ
}
, i.e. Strategic Conversion obtained.
(B). In the simultaneous game, one of these three sets of conditions ensures the exis-
tence of the Status Quo:
(a)
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
C
a,e
θ
> C
a,e
θ
S
a,e
θ
> S
a,e
θ
(b)
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
C
a,e
θ
> C
a,e
θ
S
a,e
θ
= S
a,e
θ
C
a,e
θ
> C
a,e
θ
(c)
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
C
a,e
θ
= C
a,e
θ
S
a,e
θ
> S
a,e
θ
C
a,e
θ
> C
a,e
θ
.
Sets (b) and (c) are immediately ruled out since, from Lemma 1, C
a,e
θ
< C
a,e
θ
and C
a,e
θ
<
C
a,e
θ
. Note that these two inequalities rule out Strategic Conversion and pure early
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conversion (south-west cell of Table 1), respectively. Furthermore, for set (a) to ensure
uniqueness of the Status Quo, we must have either C
a,e
θ
> C
a,e
θ
or S
a,e
θ
> S
a,e
θ
. Since the
ﬁrst inequality always holds from Lemma 1, uniqueness follows.
If shareholders move ﬁrst, the strategic motive for early conversion is eliminated. As
Strategic Conversion is inaccessible, this type of sequential game produces exactly the
same outcomes as the simultaneous game. 
Proof of Proposition 3
One needs to study the sign of S
a,e
θ
− S
a,e
θ
and C
a,e
θ
− C
a,e
θ
as a function of V .
The function S
a,e
θ
−S
a,e
θ
is a linear combination of calls involving two diﬀerent strikes:
F +M and F +M/q. Therefore, the behavior of the function S
a,e
θ
−S
a,e
θ
with respect to
V must be examined in three diﬀerent regions at most.
For V << F +M, the options with the highest strike price are the deepest out of the
money. Thus,
S
a,e
θ
− S
a,e
θ
≈ c (V
θ
, T − θ, F +M,σ)− c (V
θ
, T − θ,F +M,α) ,
which decreases with V (since the call with volatility α gains moneyness more quickly).
Consequently,
lim
V
θ
→0
+
S
a,e
θ
− S
a,e
θ
= lim
V
θ
→0
+
c (V
θ
, T − θ,F +M,σ)− c (V
θ
, T − θ,F +M,α) = 0
−
.
For V >> F +M/q, the options with the lowest strike price are the deepest out of
the money. Thus,
S
a,e
θ
− S
a,e
θ
≈ q · c (V
θ
, T − θ, F +M/q,α)− q · c (V
θ
, T − θ, F +M/q, σ) ,
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which decreases with V (since the call with volatility σ loses moneyness more quickly).
As V goes to inﬁnity, all the calls converge to their intrinsic values. Yet, the calls with
volatility α > σ converge more slowly. Thus,
lim
V
θ
→∞
S
a,e
θ
− S
a,e
θ
= 0
+
.
Combining all of these results, we obtain the following table for S
a,e
θ
− S
a,e
θ
Domain 0 0 < V << F +M F +M/q << V +∞
S
a,e
θ
− S
a,e
θ
0
−
decreasing decreasing 0
+
Therefore, there is a unique root for equation S
a,e
θ
− S
a,e
θ
= 0, denoted by V
S
θ
.
The function C
a,e
θ
− C
a,e
θ
is a linear combination of calls involving three diﬀerent
strikes: F , F +M and F +M/q. Therefore, the behavior of the function C
a,e
θ
−C
a,e
θ
with
respect to V must be examined in four diﬀerent regions at most.
For V << F , the options with the highest strike price are the deepest out of the
money. Thus,
C
a,e
θ
− C
a,e
θ
≈ c (V
θ
, T − θ,F, σ)− q · c (V
θ
, T − θ,F, α) .
The increasing or decreasing behavior of C
a,e
θ
− C
a,e
θ
as a function of V then depends
on the net eﬀect of the conversion ratio q and the shifted volatility α. The conversion
ratio eﬀect is linear in call value (q ·c (V
θ
, T − θ,F,α)) whereas the shifted volatility eﬀect
is convex in call value (with slope higher than 1). Consequently, the net eﬀect is such
that C
a,e
θ
−C
a,e
θ
decreases with V (since the call with volatility α gains moneyness more
quickly) except for the extreme case where q is very close to 1 and α is very close to
σ. Since this extreme case is economically meaningless (convertible debtholders have the
option to own almost the entire ﬁrm and risk-shifting opportunity is almost insigniﬁcant),
we will discard it throughout the analysis.
24
Furthermore,
lim
V
θ
→0
+
C
a,e
θ
− C
a,e
θ
= lim
V
θ
→0
+
c (V
θ
, T − θ,F, σ)− q · c (V
θ
, T − θ,F,α) = 0
−
.
For V >> F +M/q, the options with the lowest strike price are the deepest out of
the money. Thus,
C
a,e
θ
−C
a,e
θ
≈ q · c (V
θ
, T − θ,F +M/q, σ) ,
which increases with V .
Furthermore, as V goes to inﬁnity, all the calls converge to their intrinsic values. Yet,
the calls with volatility α > σ converge more slowly
lim
V
θ
→∞
C
a,e
θ
− C
a,e
θ
= 0
−
.
Combining all of these results, we obtain the following table sign for C
a,e
θ
− C
a,e
θ
Domain 0 0 < V << F F +M/q << V +∞
C
a,e
θ
−C
a,e
θ
0
−
decreasing increasing 0
−
The function C
a,e
θ
− C
a,e
θ
can exhibit two more behaviors with respect to V because of
the intermediate strike (F +M). Thus, there is either zero or two roots for equation
C
a,e
θ
−C
a,e
θ
= 0.
Note that if there are two roots, then the lowest one V
C−
θ
is lower than F+M. Hence,
we obtain from the analysis of S
a,e
θ
− S
a,e
θ
that
V
C−
θ
< V
S
θ
,
which concludes the proof of Proposition 3. 
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Proof of Proposition 4
From Proposition 2, the condition C
a,e
θ
−C
a,e
θ
> 0 is necessary for Strategic Conversion to
hold. Hence, Strategic Conversion is chosen only if, as a result, convertible debtholders
are better oﬀ. Furthermore, we show below that there is no wealth expropriation at the
expense of shareholders. Indeed, ﬁrst note that under Strategic Conversion, equity value
is given by
S
a,e
θ
= (1− q) · c (V
θ
, T − θ,F,α) .
Hence, using equation (1), the wealth transfer to shareholders is given by
S
a,e
θ
− S
a,e
θ
= (1− q) · c (V
θ
, T − θ,F,α)
−c (V
θ
, T − θ,F +M,σ) + q · c (V
θ
, T − θ,F +M/q, σ)
≥ (1− q) · c (V
θ
, T − θ,F, σ)
−c (V
θ
, T − θ,F +M,σ) + q · c (V
θ
, T − θ,F +M/q, σ)
≥ 0
where the ﬁrst inequality stems from the fact that α > σ, and the second inequality
stems from the convexity of call option prices with respect to the strike price. Thus,
Strategic Conversion is chosen only if, as a result, both shareholders and convertible
debtholders are better oﬀ. The wealth expropriation is entirely made at the expense of
straight debtholders. 
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Tables
Table 1: Sets of security values
at the time of risk-shifting opportunity.
Early No early
conversion conversion
Asset substitution
{
S
a,e
θ
, C
a,e
θ
}
{
S
a,e
θ
, C
a,e
θ
}
No asset substitution
{
S
a,e
θ
, C
a,e
θ
} {
S
a,e
θ
, C
a,e
θ
}
Table 1 indicates the four possible values at the time of risk-shifting opportunity (θ) of eq-
uity (S) and convertible debt (C) whether asset substitution takes place or not, and whether
convertible debtholders exercise their conversion option at date θ (early conversion) or at debt
maturity T (no early conversion). Superscripts (a, a) and (e, e) account for the asset vs. no asset
substitution cases and the early vs. no early conversion cases, respectively.
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Table 2: Equilibrium probabilities.
Optimal Conditional Probability
contract probability (%) of risk-shifting
(M
∗
, q
∗
) SQ PAS SC opportunity (%)
Base case (29.9, 0.50) 59.1 37.3 3.6 39.35
F = 30 (24.9, 0.50) 79.9 15.1 5.0 39.35
F = 50 (33.0, 0.50) 45.7 51.4 2.9 39.35
α = 0.25 (28.5, 0.65) 69.8 25.9 4.3 39.35
α = 0.35 (27.4, 0.33) 49.3 47.4 3.3 39.35
λ = 0.02 (29.9, 0.50) 60.8 35.0 4.2 18.13
λ = 0.1 (29.7, 0.50) 56.0 41.1 2.9 63.21
T = 5 (19.9, 0.50) 78.1 17.3 4.6 22.12
T = 15 (38.9, 0.50) 53.5 43.0 3.5 52.76
Base case parameters are as follows. Initial asset value is V = 100, growth rate of asset
value is μ = 0.1, asset volatility is σ = 0.2. Straight debt contract design is F = 40, and
T = 10. Risk-free rate is r = 0.04. Shifted volatility is α = 0.3. Instantaneous probability of
the risk-shifting opportunity is λ = 0.05. In subsequent lines, one parameter value is changed
above and below its base case setting. Optimal convertible debt contract is the couple (M
∗
, q
∗
)
that maximizes the initial probability of Status Quo and is found numerically. Conditional prob-
abilities are unconditional probabilities divided by the probability of risk-shifting opportunity
(1− exp (−λT)).
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Figures
Claimholders 
agree on the initial 
capital structure
Risk-shifting opportunity arises:
- Convertible debtholders decide on conversion
- Shareholders decide on risk shifting
Debt claims 
mature
0 θ T
Figure 1: Timing of events.
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Figure 2: Equilibria as a function of asset value for various capital structures
and risk-shifting opportunity.
Figure 2 plots the value of S
a,e
θ
− S
a,e
θ
(solid line denoted ∆S) and C
a,e
θ
− C
a,e
θ
(dashed
line denoted ∆C) as a function of asset value. Common parameters across the four ﬁgures are:
remaining debt maturity at the time of risk-shifting opportunity T−θ = 5, risk-free rate r = 0.04,
and initial volatility σ = 0.2. Other parameters (straight debt face value F , convertible debt face
value M , conversion ratio q, and shifted volatility α) are reported in the ﬁgure’s caption. Call
option values are obtained under the Black-Scholes model.
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Figure 3: Equilibria for diﬀerent levels of asset value and shifted volatility.
Figures 3a, 3b, 3c and 3d plot the frontiers separating Status Quo from Pure Asset Substitution
(∆S = 0) and Status Quo from Strategic Conversion (∆C = 0). Base case parameters are:
remaining debt maturity at the time of risk-shifting opportunity T−θ = 5, risk-free rate r = 0.04,
and initial volatility σ = 0.2. On Figure 3a, straight debt face value is F = 40, convertible debt
face value is M = 20, and conversion ratio is q = 0.4. In Figure 3b, straight debt face value
is modiﬁed to F = 50. In Figure 3c, convertible debt face value is modiﬁed to M = 30. In
Figure 3d, conversion ratio is modiﬁed to q = 0.5. Call option values are obtained under the
Black-Scholes model.
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Figure 4: Probability of Status Quo.
In the space (M,q) of convertible debt design, Figure 4 plots the probability of Status Quo.
Base case parameters are: initial value of assets V = 100, debt maturity T = 10, straight
debt nominal F = 40, risk-free rate r = 0.04, growth rate of assets μ = 0.1, initial volatility
σ = 0.2, shifted volatility α = 0.3, and instantaneous probability of the risk-shifting opportunity
λ = 0.05. Call option values are obtained under the Black-Scholes model
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Figure 5a: Without dividend
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Figure 5b: With dividend
Figures 5a and 5b: Special dividend and equilibria.
Figures 5a and 5b plot the frontiers separating Status Quo from Pure Asset Substitution
(∆S = 0) and Status Quo from Strategic Conversion (∆C = 0). Base case parameters are:
remaining debt maturity at the time of risk-shifting opportunity T − θ = 5, straight debt face
value F = 40, risk-free rate r = 0.04, initial volatility σ = 0.2, convertible debt face value
M = 20, and conversion ratio q = 0.4. In Figure 5a, there is no dividend. In Figure 5b, there is
a special dividend of δ = 2. Call option values are obtained under the Black-Scholes model.
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